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Blackwell’s theorem shows the equivalence of two preorders on the set of
information channels. Here, we restate, and slightly generalize, his result in
terms of random variables. Furthermore, we prove that the corresponding
partial order is not a lattice; that is, least upper bounds and greatest lower
bounds do not exist.
1 Introduction
In 1953 Blackwell showed the equivalence of two preorders on the set of information
channels [2]. Given two information channels µ, κ with the same source X , Blackwell
considers the maximal expected reward a rational agent can obtain when decisions are
based on the output of κ or µ respectively. Now, κ is defined to be more informative
than µ if, in any decision problem, the agent can perform better by using κ instead of
µ. Blackwell’s theorem provides an equivalent characterization in terms of an algebraic
relation between the information channels: κ is more informative than µ if and only if
µ can be replicated by chaining the output of κ through an additional channel λ. Next,
we present a rigorous formulation of these definitions and results in terms of random
variables.
Consider three random variable X, Y, Z with finite state spaces X ,Y ,Z. Suppose that
an agent has a finite set of possible actions A. After the agent chooses her action a ∈ A,
she receives a reward u(x, a), which not only depends on the chosen action a ∈ A, but
also on the value x ∈ X of the random variable X . The tuple (p,A, u), consisting of
the prior distribution p of X , the set of possible actions A and the reward function u is
called a decision problem. If the agent can observe the value x of X before choosing her
action, her best strategy is to chose a such that u(x, a) = maxa′∈A u(x, a
′).
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Suppose that the agent cannot observe X directly, but the agent knows the probability
distribution p of X . Moreover, the agent observes a random variable Y with conditional
distribution equal to κ(x; Y ), where κ belongs to the set
K(X ;Y) =
{
κ ∈ [0, 1]X×Y :
∑
y∈Y
κ(x; y) = 1 for all x
}
of (row) stochastic matrices. κ will also be called a channel from X to Y , and X is the
domain of κ. When using a channel κ, the agent’s optimal strategy is to choose her
action such that her expected reward
∑
x
P (X = x|Y = y)u(x, a) =
∑
x p(x)κ(x; y)u(x, a)∑
x∈X p(x)κ(x; y)
(1)
is maximal. Note that, in order to maximize (1), the agent has to know (or estimate)
the prior distribution of X as well as the channel κ. Often, the agent is allowed to play
a stochastic strategy. However, in the present setting, the agent cannot increase her
expected reward by randomizing her actions, and therefore, we only consider determin-
istic strategies here. Probabilistic strategies do sometimes lead to a nicer mathematical
formulation, see Remark 11 below.
Let R(κ, p, u, y) be the maximum of (1) (over a ∈ A), and let
R(κ, p, u) =
∑
x
P (Y = y)R(κ, p, u, y)
be the maximal expected reward that the agent can achieve by always choosing the
optimal action. In this setting, we make the following definition:
Definition 1. Let X, Y, Z be three random variables, let p be the marginal distribution
of X , and let κ ∈ K(X ;Y), µ ∈ K(X ;Z) such that
P (X = x, Y = y) = p(x)κ(x; y) and P (X = x, Z = z) = p(x)µ(x; z). (2)
Y is more informative aboutX than Z, if for any decision problem (p,A, u) the inequal-
ity R(κ, p, u) ≥ R(µ, p, u) holds. In this situation we also say that Y knows everything
that Z knows about X , and we write Y ⊒X Z.
More generally, one could try to quantify how much of the information that Y has
about X is unknown to Z, i.e. the unique information of Y , as compared to how much of
the information aboutX is shared between Y and Z. Here, we do not further explore this
idea, but the paper [1] discusses one way to decompose the mutual information MI(X :
{Y, Z}) along those lines; see also references therein for other possible decompositions.
Definition 1 compares the random variables Y and Z using only the marginal distri-
bution p of X and the conditional distributions κ, µ of Y and Z, respectively, given X .
It is also possible to ignore the marginal distribution of p and directly compare the two
channels κ and µ. The information of X is passed through these channels and then
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needs to be decoded in view of the decision problem at hand. The channels can be ap-
plied to arbitrary random variables (having the same state space), that is, the marginal
distribution p of X may be arbitrary. As an example, one may think about a device
that measures a physical observable (possibly with stochastic noise). Depending on the
experiment in which this device is used, the prior distribution of the observable changes.
Nevertheless, the characteristics of the measurement error do not depend on the experi-
ment. In this setting we make the following definition, which corresponds to Blackwell’s
original definition:
Definition 2. Let κ ∈ K(X ;Y) and µ ∈ K(X ;Z) be two channels with domain X . κ is
more informative than µ, if for any decision problem (p,A, u) the inequality R(κ, p, u) ≥
R(µ, p, u) holds. In this situation we also write κ ⊒X µ.
Definitions 1 and 2 define two relations ⊒X and ⊒X on the sets of random variables
and on the set of stochastic matrices with domain X . These two relations are preorders,
that is, they are reflexive and transitive. They are related to the following preorders:
Definition 3. • Write Y ⊒′X Z if there is a random variable Z
′ such that the
following two conditions hold:
1. The Markov chain X → Y → Z ′ holds (that is, X and Z ′ are conditionally
independent given Y ).
2. The pairs (X,Z) and (X,Z ′) have the same distribution.
• Write κ ⊒′X µ if there is a stochastic matrix λ such that µ = κλ.
The order ⊒′X is sometimes also called the majorization order [5].
Clearly, if there is a Markov chain X
κ
−→ Y
λ
−→ Z, then Y knows everything that Z
about X , and the same is true if there is a Markov chain X
κ
−→ Y
λ
−→ Z ′ for a variable
Z ′ that has the same joint distribution with X as Z. Similarly, if µ = κλ, then κ ⊒X µ.
Therefore, Y ⊒′X Z implies Y ⊒X Z, and κ ⊒
′
X µ implies κ ⊒X µ. Surprisingly, the
converse implications also hold, as the following result shows:
Theorem 4 (Sherman-Stein-Blackwell theorem).
1. κ ⊒′X µ if and only if κ ⊒X µ.
2. Y ⊒′X Z if and only if Y ⊒X Z.
3. Let X, Y, Z be three random variables, let p be the marginal distribution of X.
Assume that p(x) > 0 for all x ∈ X , and let κ ∈ K(X ;Y), µ ∈ K(X ;Z) be the
conditional distributions of Y and Z given X. Then κ ⊒X µ if and only if Y ⊒X Z.
Proof. See Section 3 in [2] for a short proof of 1). To prove 3), observe that κ ⊒X µ
implies Y ⊒X Z by definition. For the other direction, let u be a reward function and let q
be a probability distribution forX . Define a reward function u′ via u′(x, a) = q(x)
p(x)
u(x, a).
Then ∑
x p(x)κ(x; y)u
′(x, a)∑
x∈X p(x)κ(x; y)
=
∑
x q(x)κ(x; y)u(x, a)∑
x∈X p(x)κ(x; y)
,
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and thus the optimal strategy when X is distributed according to q and the reward is u
is the same as the optimal strategy when X is distributed according to p and the reward
is u′. Therefore, R(κ, q, u) = R(κ, p, u′) ≥ R(µ, p, u′) = R(µ, q, u). Finally, 2) is a direct
consequence of 1) and 3).
We call Theorem 4 Blackwell’s theorem, since the most difficult part of the proof is
the equivalence of 1. and 3., which is usually called Blackwell’s theorem. However, in
the following we only use the case that all state spaces X ,Y and Z are finite, and in this
case the result was proven by Sherman and Stein; see references in [2]. In the following,
we call ⊒X and ⊒X the Blackwell preorders.
The rest of this manuscript is organized as follows: In Section 2 we define the zonotope
preorder, which is weaker than the Blackwell preorder. To show that the Blackwell order
does not define a lattice, it is sufficient to show that the zonotope preorder does not define
a lattice. In Section 3 we mention Blackwell’s k-decision orders, which generalize the
zonotope order. In Section 4 we discuss the binary case, i.e. |X | = 2. In this special
case, all k-decision orders agree and define a lattice. In Section 5 we show that this is
not true for |X | > 2.
Most of the mathematical results of this contribution are known; except a slight gener-
alization of Blackwell’s theorem to random variables. However, the fact that Blackwell’s
relation does not define a lattice seems to be widely unknown.
2 The zonotope order
For any finite sets X ,Y denote by K(X ;Y) the set of (row) stochastic matrices, and
denote by K(X ) the union of all sets K(X ;Y) for arbitrary finite sets Y .1 In this section
we define another preorder on K(X ). To each stochastic matrix κ ∈ K(X ;Y) and y ∈ Y
denote by κy the yth column of κ. The zonotope of κ is the convex set
Zκ =
{∑
y∈Y
ayκy : ay ∈ [0; 1] for all y ∈ Y
}
=
{
κa : a ∈ [0; 1]Y
}
.
In other words, Zκ is the image of the unit cube [0, 1]
Y under the linear map correspond-
ing to κ. The zonotope Zκ is a polytope. Every vertex of Zκ is an image of a vertex of
the hypercube [0; 1]Y under κ, that is, the vertices of Zκ are a subset of κ({0, 1}
Y).
Denote by 0X and 1X the vectors (0, . . . , 0), (1, . . . , 1) ∈ R
X . The zonotope of κ has
the following properties:
Lemma 5. • Zκ ⊆ [0, 1]
X .
• Zκ contains the vertices 0X and 1X . Hence the diagonal 01 = {(r, r, r) : 0 ≤ r ≤ 1}
of the hypercube [0, 1]X is a subset of Zκ.
1
K(X ) may not be a set in the strict set theoretical sense. Later, only the cardinality of the target
sets Y plays a role, and if we identify sets of the same (finite) cardinality and the corresponding
stochastic matrices, we obtain again a set.
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• Zκ has the following symmetry: If v ∈ Zκ, then 1X − v ∈ Zκ. In fact, if v = κa,
then 1X − v = κ(1X − a).
Definition 6. The zonotope order is the preorder X on K(X ) defined as follows: For
κ, µ ∈ K(X ) the relation κ X µ holds if and only if Zκ ⊇ Zµ.
The zonotope order is related to the Blackwell order:
Lemma 7. Let κ, µ ∈ K(X ). If κ ⊒′X µ, then κ X µ.
Proof. Observe that Zµ = (κλ)([0, 1]
Z) = κ(Zλ) ⊆ κ([0, 1]
Y) = Zκ.
In general, the converse of Lemma 7 is false, unless |X | = 2, see Sections 4 and 5. The
following weaker statement always holds:
Lemma 8. Let κ, µ ∈ K(X ). If Zµ = Zκ, then µ ⊒
′
X κ and κ ⊒
′
X µ.
Proof. Each zonotope has a unique minimal set of generators, which consists of the set
of edge vectors. Let ν1, . . . , νr be the minimal generators of the zonotope Zκ = Zµ.
The vectors ν1, . . . , νr form the columns of a stochastic matrix ν (indeed, they are non-
negative, and their sum equals 1X ). It suffices to show that µ ⊒
′
X ν and ν ⊒
′
X µ.
The rows µy, y ∈ Y , of µ are another set of generators of Zµ. If a generating set of a
zonotope is not minimal, then some of these generators must be proportional, and every
generator is proportional to a minimal generator. More precisely, there is a partition
Y = Y1 ∪ · · · ∪ Yr of Y and there are scalars ay for all y ∈ Y such that the following
holds:
• νi =
∑
y∈Yi
µy for all i = 1, . . . , r.
• µy = ayνi for all i = 1, . . . , r and for all y ∈ Yi.
Observe that νi =
∑
y∈Yi
ayνi, and thus
∑
y∈Yi
ay = 1. Let λ
(1) ∈ RY×r, λ(2) ∈ Rr×Y be
the matrices with matrix elements
(λ(1))y,i =
{
1, if y ∈ Yi,
0, else,
, and (λ(2))i,y =
{
ay, if y ∈ Yi,
0, else.
λ(1) is stochastic, since every row contains precisely one non-zero entry, which is equal to
one. λ(2) is stochastic, since
∑
y∈Y λ
(2)
i,y =
∑
y∈Yi
ay = 1. Then ν = µλ
(1) and µ = νλ(2).
Therefore, ν ⊒′X µ ⊒
′
X ν. By symmetry, ν ⊒
′
X κ ⊒
′
X ν, and so the statement follows.
Lemma 8 shows that the two preorders ⊒X and X define the same equivalence
relation:
κ ∼ µ :⇐⇒ (κ ⊒X µ ⊒X κ) ⇐⇒ (κ X µ X κ) .
Therefore, the two preorders ⊒X and X induce orders on the set K(X )/ ∼ of stochastic
matrices modulo the equivalence ∼. Lemma 7 shows that X is a refinement of ⊒X . The
preorder X can also be given an interpretation in terms of binary decision problems,
that is, decision problems where the agent has only two options:
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Proposition 9. The following statements are equivalent:
1. R(κ, p, u) ≥ R(µ, p, u) for all binary decision problems (p, {0, 1}, u).
2. There exists a prior distribution p of X with full support such that R(κ, p, u) ≥
R(µ, p, u) for all binary decision problems (p, {0, 1}, u).
3. κ X µ.
The proof of Proposition 9 makes use of the following Lemma, which will also be
needed later:
Lemma 10. If v ∈ Zκ, then the kernel µ(v) = (v, 1X − v) satisfies κ ⊒
′
X µ(v) and
v ∈ Zµ(v).
Proof. Since v ∈ Zκ, there exists a ∈ [0; 1]
Y with v = κ(a). Then λ = (a, 1Y − a) is a
stochastic matrix satisfying µ(v) = κλ.
Proof of Proposition 9. The equivalence between 1) and 2) can be proven as in the proof
of Theorem 4.
Suppose there exists v ∈ Zµ with v /∈ Zκ. Then v ∈ Zµv \ Zκ, and by Blackwell’s
theorem, there exist A′, p and u′ ∈ RX×A
′
such that R(µ(v), p, u
′) > R(κ, p, u′). Consider
the optimal strategy of an agent who only observes the outcome of the channel µ(v). Since
µ(v) is binary, this optimal strategy only makes use of a two-element subset of A
′, say
A ⊆ A′. Let u be the restriction of u′ to RX×A. Then R(µ, p, u) ≥ R(µ(v), p, u) =
R(µ(v), p, u
′) > R(κ, p, u′) ≥ R(κ, p, u), where the first inequality follows from µ ⊒′ µ(v)
(by Lemma 10), and the last inequality comes from the fact that an agent who observes
κ cannot perform better if its options are restricted from A′ to A. Therefore, if Zµ is
not a sub-zonotope of Zκ, then there is a binary decision problem in which µ performs
better than κ.
Conversely, assume that µ performs better than κ in some binary decision problem
with A = {0, 1} and reward function u. Fix some optimal strategy, let Z0 be the
subset of Z where the agent chooses action 0, and let Z1 = Z \ Z0. Let v =
∑
z∈Z0
µz
be the sum of the columns of µ indexed by Z0. Then µ ⊒
′ µv, and so R(µ, p, u) ≥
R(µv, p, u). In fact, since the agent only needs to know which action it has to choose (it
can forget any other information contained in the output of the channel µ), it follows
that R(µv, p, u) = R(µ, p, u) > R(κ, p, u). By Lemma 10 and Blackwell’s theorem, Zµv
is not a sub-zonotope of Zκ. Therefore, Zµ (which contains Zµv) is not a sub-zonotope
of Zκ either.
Remark 11. The proof of Proposition 9 implicitly uses the following construction: The
action that the agent chooses can be considered as a random variable A. This is true
both in the case that the agent has a deterministic strategy (depending on the observed
random variable Y ) and in the case that the agent is allowed to have a probabilistic
strategy. A satisfies the Markov chain X → Y → A. Denote by µA ∈ K(X ;A)
the stochastic matrix describing the probability of the agent’s action given X . Then
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κ ⊒′X µA. Conversely, any µ ∈ K(X ) satisfying κ ⊒
′
X µ can be interpreted as a
probabilistic strategy that the agent may use.
By Lemma 10, any v ∈ Zκ corresponds to a kernel µ(v) lying below κ in the Blackwell
order. Such a kernel can be interpreted as a stochastic binary strategy. Therefore, the
elements of Zκ correspond to the set of stochastic binary strategies that the agent who
observes Y may play.
Remark 12. The zonotope Zκ is related to the Lorenz zonoid that is used to quantify
the disparity of the joint distribution of goods in a population [4]. In the case of a finite
population, the zonoid becomes a zonotope. The inclusion of Lorenz zonoids defines an
order, called Lorenz zonoid order.
3 k-decision problems.
In [2], Blackwell also introduces the following preorders:
Definition 13. For any k > 1, the k-decision order is the preorder defined on K(X )
as follows: For κ, µ ∈ K(X ) the relation κ X ;k µ holds if and only if for any decision
problem (p,A, u) with |A| ≤ k the inequality R(κ, p, u) ≥ R(µ, p, u) holds.
Lemma 14. 1. κ X ;2 µ if and only if κ X µ.
2. κ X ;k+1 µ implies κ X ;k µ for all k ≥ 2.
3. κ ⊒X µ implies κ X ;k µ for all k ≥ 2.
4. If κ X ;k µ for all k ≥ 2, then κ ⊒X µ.
5. If κ ∈ K(X ;Y), µ ∈ K(X ;Z) and κ X ;k µ with k ≥ |Z|, then κ ⊒X µ.
Proof. Statement 1) follows from Proposition 9. Statements 2) to 4) are direct. State-
ment 5) follows since a deterministic strategy cannot make use of more actions than the
number of possible outputs.
According to an unpublished paper of Stein (cited in [2]), the preorders X ;2,X ;3
, . . . ,X ;|X | are all different in general. In Section 5, we give an example that shows that
X ;2=X is different from ⊒X and from X ;3 for |X | = 3.
4 The case |X | = 2.
In this section we collect some aspects in which the binary case |X | = 2 is different from
the general case. First, the zonotope order and the Blackwell order are identical (and
hence, all the k-decision orders agree). Moreover, the Blackwell order defines a lattice.
These results are well-known. We derive them from [2]; see [3] for a proof from the
perspective of majorization theory.
Proposition 15. Let κ, µ ∈ K({0, 1}). Then κ {0,1} µ if and only if κ ⊒
′
{0,1} µ.
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Proof. See [2, Theorem 10].
Proposition 16. If |X | = 2, then the Blackwell order defines a lattice.
The proof makes use of the following lemma:
Lemma 17. If |X | = 2, then a zonotope is of the form Z = Zκ for some κ ∈ K(X ) if
and only if Z satisfies the properties of Lemma 5.
Proof. Due to symmetry, the number of vertices of Z is even; say 2n. Let x0 =
0X , x1, . . . , x2n−1 be the vertices of Z ordered counterclockwise. Then xn = 1X . Let
κi = xi− xi−1 for i = 1, . . . , n be the edge vectors of Z, and let κ ∈ R
X×n be the matrix
with columns κ1, . . . , κn. By convexity of Z, all vectors κ1, . . . , κn are non-negative.
Moreover, κ1 + · · ·+ κn = 1X . Hence, κ is a stochastic matrix. Clearly, Z = Zκ.
Proof of Proposition 16. It suffices to show that the zonotope order defines a lattice. For
κ, µ ∈ K(X ) let Z∧ = Zκ ∩Zµ, and let Z∨ be the convex hull of Zκ ∪Zµ. By Lemma 17
there exist κ∧, κ∨ ∈ K(X ) with Z∧ = Zµ∧ and Z∨ = Zµ∨ . Any common lower bound κ
′
of κ and µ satisfies Zκ′ ⊆ Z∧, and any upper bound µ
′ satisfies Z∨ ⊆ Zµ′ . The statement
now follows from Proposition 15.
5 The case |X | > 2.
In this section, assume that |X | > 2. In this case, the converse of Lemma 7 does not hold,
i.e. there are stochastic matrices κ ∈ K(X ;Y), µ ∈ K(X ;Z) with κ 6⊒′ µ and Zµ ⊆ Zκ.
This fact is mentioned in [3], but no example is given. By Lemma 10, in such an example
the matrix µ must have at least three columns. Here comes an example:
Example 18. Let
κ =

12 0 0 120 1
2
0 1
2
0 0 1
2
1
2

 and µ =

12 12 01
2
0 1
2
0 1
2
1
2

 .
For each i ∈ {1, 2, 3} there is a unique way of writing µi as a linear combination of
κ1, . . . , κ4 with non-negative coefficients. That is,
λ =


1 1 0
1 0 1
0 1 1
0 0 0


is the unique non-negative matrix satisfying µ = κλ. Alas, λ is not stochastic, and so
κ 6⊒′ µ. However, Zµ ⊂ Zκ. To show this, it suffices to show that all vertices of Zµ
lie in Zκ, or that all vectors of the form µi or µi + µj (for i 6= j) lie in Zµ (the vector
µ1 + µ2 + µ3 = 1X lies in Zµ). Since all coefficients of λ lie in [0, 1], the vectors µi lie
in Zκ, and hence 1X − µi ∈ Zκ. Moreover, the relation µ1 + µ2 + µ3 = 1X shows that
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d)c)
b)a)
Figure 1: a), b) Two zonotopes. c) Their union. d) Their intersection, which happens
to be not a zonotope.
µi + µj = 1X − µk for any permutation (i, j, k) of (1, 2, 3). Therefore, all vertices of Zµ
lie in Zκ.
It is also possible to find a concrete decision problem for which µ is better than κ: Let
u =

−5 1 11 −5 1
1 1 −5

 .
In this case, there are three different actions. Action i gives a reward of +1 if X 6= i
and a penalty of −5 if X = i. Using the channel µ it is possible to obtain the expected
reward +1, while the maximal expected reward when using channel κ is −2. This shows
that the preorders X and X ;2 are indeed different.
Theorem 19. If |X | > 2, then the preorders ⊒ and  do not define lattices on K(X ).
In general, neither greatest lower bounds nor least upper bounds exist.
Proof. The proof builds on the fact, that in general, the intersection of two zonotopes
is not a zonotope. As an example, consider the two stochastic matrices
κ1 =

 13 23 00 1
3
2
3
2
3
0 1
3

 and κ2 =

23 13 00 2
3
1
3
1
3
0 2
3

 .
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Then Zκ1 ∩ Zκ2 is the convex hull of the columns of the matrix
0 56 26 26 16 46 46 10 2
6
5
6
2
6
4
6
1
6
4
6
1
0 2
6
2
6
5
6
4
6
4
6
1
6
1

 ;
and this is not a zonotope. This can be seen from Fig. (1) showing Zκ1 (a), Zκ2 (b),
their union (c), and their intersetion (d), which is not a zonotope: A face of a zonotope
is again a zonotope, but Zκ1 ∩ Zκ2 contains triangular faces.
We claim that, if Zκ1 ∩ Zκ2 is not a zonotope, then κ1 and κ2 have more than one
greatest common lower bound with respect to ⊒X and X . The argument only involves
lower bounds of the form µ(v), as defined in Lemma 10, and therefore, the argument will
be valid for both the preorder ⊒X and the preorder X .
If µ is a greatest common lower bound, then Zκ1 ⊇ Zµ ⊆ Zκ2 , and so Zµ ⊆ Zκ1 ∩Zκ2.
By Lemma 10, for any v ∈ Zκ1 ∩ Zκ2 there is a kernel µ(v) with v ∈ Zµ(v), κ1 ≻ µ(v)
and κ2 ≻ µ(v), and so µ(v) is a lower bound for κ1 and κ2. Therefore, if µ is the unique
greatest common lower bound, by Lemma 7, µ must satisfy v ∈ Zµ(v) ⊆ Zµ for all
v ∈ Zκ1 ∩ Zκ2; and so Zκ1 ∩ Zκ2 ⊆ Zµ for i = 1, 2. Therefore, Zµ = Zκ1 ∩ Zκ2 , which is
impossible.
Unique least upper bounds do not exist either in this case: Let V be the set of vertices
of Zκ1 ∩ Zκ2. Then both κ1 and κ2 are upper bounds of {µ(v) : v ∈ V }. If there exists a
least upper bound µ of the finite set {µ(v) : v ∈ V }, then κi ⊒
′
X µ ⊒
′
X µ(v) for i = 1, 2 and
v ∈ V , and hence
⋃
v∈V Zµ(v) ⊆ Zµ ⊆ Zκ1 ∩ Zκ2. Hence Zµ contains the convex hull of⋃
v∈V Zµ(v) , which is equal to Zκ1 ∩Zκ2. Therefore, Zµ = Zκ1 ∩Zκ2, a contradiction.
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